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ABSTRACT 
 
In the previous paper [2] by the authors, parametric simulation models are developed 
for structural analysis of voting behaviors in public referendum. By decomposing the 
residents into eight groups, a mechanism is established to construct transition 
probability matrices defined on three states (0: Undecided; 1: YES; 2: NO), thereby 
capturing behavioral patterns of the residents in forming their individual opinions 
toward the voting date. This approach involves many parameters whose values are 
estimated so as to account for the results of eight real cases of public referendums that 
took place in Japan. In order to enhance the applicability of the approach, it is quite 
necessary to understand how sensitive the voting results would be in changes of the 
underlying parameter values. The purpose of this paper is to conduct such sensitivity 
analyses with focus on two key parameters: the incentives of the local and global 
opportunists and the levels of approval determination of the approvers. It is found that 
the voting result is insensitive to both of the two key parameters, suggesting that the 
simulation modeling approach may be used even when it is difficult to estimate those 
values accurately.  
 
Keyword: Public Referendum, Voting Behavior, Parametric Simulation Models, 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Japan, as the municipal governments are forced, more and more, to be independent 
of the central government in managing their local matters and financial needs, the 
public referendum has been recognized as an important device to settle a variety of 
local issues. Between 1996 and 2004, the total of 142 cases took place in Japan over 
such issues as whether or not to build a nuclear power plant, a waste site, a heliport 
for the U.S. army and a barrage near the exit of the Yoshino River, to shrink the U.S. 
army camp, and to merge into a city among others.  
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 While voting behavior, in general, has been studied extensively in the literature, 
the literature specifically addressing to voting behavior of public referendums and the 
like is rather limited. Karaham and William [1] analyzes a special election held in 
2001 in the State of Mississippi over the issue of whether or not the current state flag 
is identified using regression models. Thalman [3] deals with a public referendum in 
Switzerland to vote on three proposals for taxes related to fossil fuels. To the authors’ 
best knowledge, the previous paper [2] of the authors is the first to develop explicit 
models which give an insight into the structure of voting behaviors in public 
referendum.  
 
 The approach proposed in [2] involves many parameters, and it is difficult, in 
general, to estimate them accurately. However, by considering the general 
characteristics of voting behaviors in Japan, a set of the underlying parameter values 
is identified, which enables one to reconstruct, via simulation, the voting results of 
eight real cases of public referendums that actually took place in Japan. In order to 
enhance the applicability of the approach, it is quite necessary to understand how 
sensitive the voting results would be in changes of the underlying parameter values.  
The purpose of this paper is to conduct such sensitivity analyses with focus on two 
key parameters: the incentives of the local and global opportunists and the levels of 
approval determination of the approvers. 
  
 The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, a succinct summary of the 
original approach in [2] is provided. Sections 3 and 4 discuss sensitivity analyses 
concerning the two key parameters respectively. Some concluding remarks are given 
in Section 5. 
 
2. SIMULATION MODELING APPROACH FOR PUBLIC REFERENDUM 
 
This section provides a succinct summary of the simulation modeling approach 
developed in [2]. We consider a population of residents who are to make a collective 
decision of YES-or-NO type over an issue through public referendum. The voting is 
to take place K days later. It is assumed that the residents are classified into the 
following eight groups, characterizing behavioral patterns of the residents in forming 
their individual opinions toward the voting date.  
 
G(1) (Convinced Approvers): those who are determined to vote for YES from the very 
beginning and to make serious efforts to convince others in line with them. 
G(2) (Adaptable Approvers): those who have not formed their opinions in the 
beginning but have a tendency to vote for YES when the ratio of approvers in 
G(1) and G(2) increases. 
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G(3) (Independent Approvers): those who have not formed their opinions in the 
beginning, are not influenced by others, and independently have an inclination 
to vote for YES. 
G(4) (Convinced Disapprovers): those who are determined to vote for NO from the 
very beginning and to make serious efforts to convince others in line with them. 
G(5) (Adaptable Disapprovers): those who have not formed their opinions in the 
beginning but have a tendency to vote for NO when the ratio of disapprovers in 
G(4) and G(5) increases. 
G(6) (Independent Disapprovers): those who have not formed their opinions in the 
beginning, are not influenced by others, and independently have an inclination 
to vote for NO. 
G(7) (Local Opportunists): those who have not formed their opinions in the beginning 
and have a tendency to be influenced toward voting for YES by the ratio of 
approvers among G(2), G(3), G(5), G(6), and G(7). 
G(8) (Global Opportunists): those who have not formed their opinions in the 
beginning and have a tendency to be influenced toward voting for YES by the 
ratio of approvers among the entire voting population. 
 
The influential relationships among the eight groups are depicted in Figure 2.1 below 
where group m is denoted by G(m) and the arrow between G(m) and G(n) indicates 
that G(m) directly influences G(n). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Influential Relationships among Eight Residential Groups 
 
 In order to capture how the voting positions of the individuals and the eight 
groups may be transformed toward the voting date, we construct temporally and 
spatially inhomogeneous transition probability matrices defined on three states (0: 
Undecided; 1: YES; 2: NO). These matrices may change as time goes by over three 
different stages u =1, 2, 3 or as the ratio of approvers or disapprovers change over 
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three different levels v =1, 2, 3. Individuals in one group have common transition 
probability matrices but such matrices differ across different groups. In general, there 
are 3 x 3 = 9 transition probability matrices describing the behavioral pattern of G(m), 
except that both G(1) and G(4) have only one matrix since the convinced approvers in 
G(1) and the convinced disapprovers in G(4) never change their positions, and G(3) 
and G(6) have 3 matrices that are dependent on u but independent of v since those in 
G(3) or G(6) are not affected by others.  
 
 For the adaptable approvers in G(2) , the probability of voting for YES increases 
as the time index u or the index v for the ratio of approvers in G(1) and G(2) increases. 
It is also assumed that they never change their mind once they decide to vote for YES. 
The probability of voting for YES for the independent approvers in G(3) is an 
increasing function of u but independent of v as mentioned above. The structures of 
transition probability matrices for G(5) and G(6) are similar to those of G(2) and G(3) 
respectively, except that the role of the probability of voting for YES is replaced by 
the probability of voting for NO. The local opportunists in G(7) and the global 
opportunists in G(8) are similar in that they have no tendency to vote for either YES 
or NO, and are affected toward voting for YES only when the ratio of approvers 
increases substantially. However, those in G(7) are affected by G(7) itself and only 
those groups adjacent to it in Figure 2.1, whereas those in G(8) are affected by all 
groups. Readers are referred to Appendix A of [2] for further details concerning the 
mechanism of how these transition probability matrices are constructed. The transition 
probability matrices for G(2) and G(7) are exhibited in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 
respectively as examples. 
 
  In [2], a public voting model is described by a triplet (Population, Pro-Vote 
Ratio, Voting Ratio)= (P, PV-R, V-R). A model (P, PV-R, V-R) is called Basic if the 
model has approvers and disapprovers almost equal. Three basic models (Max-Vote, 
Rural, and Urban) are first developed, representing a high-voting-rate situation, a 
typical rural community and a typical urban community respectively. The three basic 
models are then expanded horizontally by altering the formation of the eight groups, 
where the voting population and the voting ratio are kept constant while the pro-vote 
ratio is varied, resulting in three fundamental types Con-Type, Basic Type, and 
Pro-Type. These 3x3=9 fundamental models are further decomposed into 9x11 = 99 
detailed models through the vertical and horizontal expansions. The eight real cases of 
public referendums are well covered by the spread of these detailed models, where the 
formations of Rural and Urban Basic models and the underlying parameter values are 
as given in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. 
4 
 
Figure 2.2 Transition Probability Matrices for G(2) 
 
 Figure 2.3 Transition Probability Matrices of G(7) 
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Table 2.1 Group Formation (%) 
Population G(1)G(2)G(3)G(4)G(5) G(6)G(7)G(8)
Rural Basic Model 10,000 5 25 5 5 25 5 10 20
U rban Basic M odel 100,000 2 3 10 2 3 10 20 50  
 
Table 2.2 Parameter Values 
α00 α00 a b b p q q r s s t w
G1 Convinced Approvers - - - - - - - - - - - - -
G2Adaptable Approvers 0.45 0.8 0.95 0.8 1.0 0.55 0.1 - 1.1 0.01 - 0.9 0.95
G3 Independent Approvers 0.45 0.8 0.95 - - 0.55 0.1 - 1.1 0.01 - - -
G4 Convinced Disapprovers - - - - - - - - - - - - -
G5 Adaptable Disapprovers 0.45 0.8 0.95 0.8 1.0 0.45 0.9 - 1.1 0.01 - 0.9 0.95
G6 Independent Disapprovers 0.45 0.8 0.95 - - 0.45 0.9 - 1.1 0.01 - - -
G7 Local Opportunists 0.80 0.6 - 0.8 1.0 0.50 0.9 0.1 - 0.01 0.01 0.9 0.95
G8Global Opportunists 0.80 0.6 - 0.8 1.0 0.50 0.9 0.1 - 0.01 0.01 0.9 0.95
̃ ̃ ̃ ̃
 
 
 
3. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR VOTING INCENTIVES OF LOCAL AND 
GLOGAL OPPORTUNISTS 
 
 In the following two sections, we focus on sensitivity analyses for two basic 
models: Rural Basic Model and Urban Basic Model. The formation of the eight 
groups and the underlying parameter values are as given in Tables 2.1 and 2.1, unless 
specified otherwise.  
 
 The first sensitivity analysis is concerned with the voting incentives of the local 
opportunists in G(7) and the global opportunists in G(8). Considering the fact that  
“undecided” often indicates less concern among the opportunists, this may be 
represented by the parameterα00(m) describing the probability that a resident in G(m) 
with a voting position undecided on day k remains undecided on day k+1 during the 
stages yet unaffected by other individuals, where m=7 or 8. The matrix below 
illustrates the transition probability matrix for G(7) as a function ofα00(7) where 
other parameter values are fixed.  
 
 α00(7) 0.5α00(7) 0.5(1-α00(7))
0.40 0.54 0.06
0.40 0.06 0.54
 
 
 
 
 
 Of particular interest is the impact of these voting incentives on the overall 
voting results. As shown in Table 2.2, one hasα00(7)=α00(8)=0.8 which is much 
higher thanα00(m) for other groups. For Rural Basic Model and Urban Basic Model, 
we varyα00(7) andα00(8) from 0.7 to 0.9 with step size of 0.05. The simulation 
results are summarized in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 for Rural Basic Model and Urban Basic 
Model respectively. The corresponding graphs are plotted in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The 
following observations can be made. 
 
< Rural Basic Model> 
・ When α00(7) andα00(8) are changed simultaneously from 0.8 to 0.8±0.05, the 
changes of the voting ratio remain within 2%, and the changes of the pro-vote 
ratio within 1%. 
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・ When α00(7) andα00(8) are changed simultaneously from 0.8 to 0.8±0.10, the 
changes of the voting ratio still remain within 7%, and the changes of the pro-vote 
ratio within 6%. 
・ With these changes, the voting results of YES are not affected. 
・ Asα00(7) andα00(8) move from 0.85 to 0.9, the rapid drops of both the voting 
ratio and the pro-vote ratio are observed. This is due to the fact that the 
opportunists could not reach the stages in which their voting incentives are 
enhanced toward YES by the ratio of approvers within their groups and other 
groups. 
 
Table 3.1 Impact of Voting Incentives of the Opportunists: Rural Basic Model  
α00(7)=α00(8)Voting(%)Approval(%)Disaproval(%)Voting(%)Approval(%)Disapproval(%)Voting(%)Approval(%)Disapproval(%)
0.70  (a) 85.21 45.47 39.75 55.90 37.81 18.09 56.06 37.48 18.58
0.75  (b) 84.33 45.17 39.16 53.70 37.18 16.52 53.09 36.13 16.96
0.80 (c )83.50 44.8 38.62 51.84 37.29 14.55 49.62 34.81 14.82
0.85  (d) 81.93 44.01 37.93 47.69 35.85 11.84 44.01 30.72 13.29
0.90  (e) 77.14 39.80 37.34 46.47 36.63 9.84 20.22 9.99 10.23
(a-c) 1.71 0.58 1.13 4.06 0.52 3.54 6.4 2.68 3.76
(b-c) 0.83 0.28 0.55 1.86 -0.11 1.97 3.47 1.33 2.14
(d-c) -1.57 -0.88 -0.69 -4.15 -1.44 -2.71 -5.61 -4.09 -1.53
(e-c) -6.36 -5.08 -1.27 -5.37 -0.66 -4.71 -29.41 -24.82 -4.59
Total G(7) G(8)
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Figure 3.1 Impact of Voting Incentives of the Opportunists: Rural Basic Model 
 
< Urban Basic Model> 
・ When α00(7) andα00(8) are changed simultaneously from 0.8 to 0.8±0.05, the 
changes of the voting ratio remain within 5%, and the changes of the pro-vote 
ratio within 3%. 
・ When α00(7) andα00(8) are changed simultaneously from 0.8 to 0.8±0.10, the 
changes of the voting ratio still remain within 10%, and the changes of the 
pro-vote ratio within 5%. 
・ With these changes, the voting results of almost break-even between Yes and No 
are not affected. 
・ The impact of the voting incentives of the opportunists on the voting results is 
larger in Urban Basic Model than that in Rural Basic Model. This is so because 
the population of the opportunists is much higher in Urban Basic Model than that 
in Rural Basic Model. 
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Table 3.2 Impact of Voting Incentives of the Opportunists: Urban Basic Model 
α00(7)=α00(8)Voting(%)Approval(%)Disaproval(%)Voting(%)Approval(%)Disapproval(%)Voting(%)Approval(%)Disapproval(%)
0.70  (a) 59.56 29.78 29.78 43.30 21.63 21.67 43.53 21.7 21.75
0.75  (b) 56.49 28.23 28.27 39.17 19.50 19.68 39.06 19.49 19.58
0.80 (c ) 52.88 26.45 26.43 34.04 17.00 17.04 33.85 16.91 16.95
0.85  (d) 48.57 24.26 24.31 27.80 13.91 13.89 27.76 13.90 13.87
0.90  (e)43.39 21.71 21.67 20.21 10.12 10.09 20.45 10.25 10.19
(a-c) 6.69 3.33 3.36 9.26 4.63 4.63 9.67 4.87 4.81
(b-c) 3.62 1.78 1.84 5.14 2.50 2.64 5.21 2.58 2.63
(d-c) -4.30 -2.18 -2.12 -6.24 -3.09 -3.15 -6.09 -3.01 -3.08
(e-c) -9.49 -4.74 -4.75 -13.83 -6.88 -6.95 -13.40 -6.65 -6.75
Total G(7) G(8)
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Figure 3.2 Impact of Voting Incentives of the Opportunists: Urban Basic Model 
 
 In summary, one may conclude that the voting result is insensitive to the 
incentives of the local and global opportunists and it may be difficult to reverse the 
voting tide by attempting to affect them. 
 
4. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR LEVELS OF APPROVAL 
DETERMINATION OF APPROVERS 
 
 We next examine the impact of the levels of approval determination among the 
approvers in G(2) and G(3) on the voting result. For this purpose, the key parameter is 
p(m) which is the probability for a resident in G(m) to move from state 0 (Undecided) 
to state 1 (YES), or from state 2 (NO) to state 1 (YES) during the stages yet 
unaffected by other individuals, where m=2 or 3. The matrix below exhibits the 
transition probability matrix for G(2) as a function of p(2) where other parameter 
values are fixed. 
 
 
0.45 0.45p(2) 0.55(1-p(2))
0 1 0 
0.20 0.08 0.72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 As we see in Table 2.2, one has p(2)=p(3)=0.55. Through the supporting 
activities by the convinced approvers, the level of approval determination may be 
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increased. In the opposite, the counter activities by the convinced disapprovers may 
lower it. Nevertheless, because of the tendency of G(2) and G(3) to vote for YES, we 
still impose the condition that p(2) > 0.5 and p(3) > 0.5. For Rural Basic Model and 
Urban Basic Model, we vary p(2) and p(3) from 0.5 to 0.65 with step size of 0.05. The 
simulation results are summarized in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 for Rural Basic Model and 
Urban Basic Model respectively. The corresponding graphs are plotted in Figures 4.1 
and 4,2. The following observations can be made. 
 
< Rural Basic Model> 
・ When p(2) and p(3) are changed simultaneously from 0.55 to 0.55±0.05, the 
changes of the voting ratio remain within 2%, and the changes of the pro-vote 
ratio within 3%. 
・ When p(2) and p(3) are changed simultaneously from 0.55 to 0.55±0.10, the 
changes of the voting ratio still remain within 1%, and the changes of the pro-vote 
ratio within 2%. 
・ With these changes, the voting results of YES are not affected. 
 
Table 4.1 Impact of Levels of Approval Determination of Approvers: Rural Basic Model 
p(2)=p(3) Voting(%)Approval(%)Disaproval(%)Voting(%)Approval(%)Disapproval(%)Voting(%)Approval(%)Disaproval(%)
0.50  (a) 82.05 42.25 39.8096.78 89.4 6.84 95.34 85.50 9.84
0.55  (b) 83.79 45.14 38.65 97.82 93.45 4.37 96.00 88.68 7.32
0.60 (c )84.54 46.41 38.13 98.36 95.14 3.22 96.90 90.04 6.86
0.65  (d) 84.74 46.73 38.01 98.60 96.10 2.50 97.18 91.80 5.38
(a-b) -1.74 -2.89 1.16 -1.04 -3.51 2.47 -0.66 -3.18 2.52
(c-b) 0.76 1.27 -0.52 0.55 1.69 -1.14 0.90 1.36 -0.46
(d-c) 0.95 1.59 -0.64 0.78 2.65 -1.87 1.18 3.12 -1.94
Total G(2) G(3)
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65
p(2)=p(3)
%
Voting Ratio
Approval Ratio
Disapproval Ratio
 
Figure 4.1 Impact of Levels of Approval Determination of Approvers: Rural Basic Model 
 
< Urban Basic Model> 
・ When p(2) and p(3) are changed simultaneously from 0.55 to 0.55±0.05, the 
changes of the voting ratio remain within 1%, and the changes of the pro-vote 
ratio also within 1%. 
・ When p(2) and p(3) are changed simultaneously from 0.55 to 0.55±0.10, the 
changes of the voting ratio still remain within 1%, and the changes of the pro-vote 
ratio also within 1%. 
・ With these changes, the voting results of almost break-even between Yes and No 
are not affected. 
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・ The impact of the levels of approval determination of the approvers on the voting 
results is larger in Rural Basic Model than that in Urban Basic Model. This is so 
because the ratio of the approvers in the entire voting population is much higher in 
Rural Basic Model than that in Urban Basic Model. 
 
Table 4.2 Impact of Levels of Approval Determination of Approvers: Urban Basic Model 
p(2)=p(3) Voting(%)Approval(%)Disapproval(%)Voting(%)Approval(%)Disapproval(%)Voting(%)Approval(%)Disapproval(%)
0.50  (a) 52.83 26.13 26.70 97.8 93.69 4.19 95.49 85.69 9.79
0.55  (b) 52.90 26.44 26.46 98.25 94.86 3.40 96.20 88.23 7.98
0.60 (c ) 52.99 26.72 26.27 98.64 96.00 2.64 96.91 90.33 6.58
0.65  (d) 53.02 26.96 26.06 98.94 96.96 1.98 97.49 92.42 5.07
(a-b) -0.07 -0.31 0.24 -0.37 -1.17 0.80 -0.72 -2.54 1.82
(c-b) 0.09 0.28 -0.19 0.38 1.14 -0.76 0.70 2.10 -1.40
(d-c) 0.12 0.52 -0.40 0.69 2.10 -1.41 1.28 4.19 -2.90
Total G(2) G(3)
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Figure 4.2 Impact of Levels of Approval Determination of Approvers: Urban Basic Model 
 
 
 In summary, one concludes that the voting result is insensitive to the levels of 
approval determination of the approvers and it may be difficult to reverse the voting 
tide by attempting to affect them. 
 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The sensitivity analyses reported in this paper reveal that the voting result is 
insensitive to both the incentives of the local and global opportunists and the levels of 
approval determination of the approvers, and consequently suggest that the simulation 
modeling approach developed in [2] is quite robust in changes of the underlying 
parameter values, and may be used even when it is difficult to estimate those values 
accurately.  
 
 Another implication is that, when one wishes to reverse the voting tide from 
YES to NO or from NO to YES, the focus ought to be on transforming the formation 
of the eight groups, rather than attempting to change individual voting behaviors 
without motivating them to shift to more favorable groups. 
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 Further study and more numerical experiments would be needed to support these 
conclusions in a more convincing manner, and will be reported elsewhere. 
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